Only a brief description
of the original document is included below Part One - The theory
In order to explain the theory of long-run equilibrium
in competitive markets, it is important to define under which
conditions a market is considered perfectly competitive. The
theory of competitive markets rests on three basic assumptions:
1. Firms are price-takers, which mean that, since none firm
has a significant market-share, all of them take the price
as given. Their decisions do not affect the market.
2. The product is undifferentiated, or in other words, one
firm's product perfectly substitutes the other firm's.
3. Free-cost entry and exit, meaning that a firm can easily
enter or exit the market with no special costs.  In addition, it is important to clarify the difference between
accounting profits and economic profits. Accounting profit
is measured by the difference between revenue and costs while
economic profits take into account the opportunity cost of
capital.
Theory of long-run equilibrium in competitive markets
This theory holds that in competitive markets, firms’
long-run economic profit is zero. The zero economic profit
implies that the firm is earning a competitive return on that
investment. It means that, the capital is
being as well invested as it could be in anywhere else. In
this equilibrium, the firm has no incentive to exit the market
nor does any other firm have incentive to entry. The underlying
assumptions of the long-run competitive equilibrium are: 1. the firms in the industry are maximizing profit
2. all firms are earning zero economic profit
3. The price is such that the quantity demanded by consumers
is equal to that produced by suppliers. Suppose that in a specific industry, firms are operating
with economic profits higher than zero. Hence, firms outside
the market have the incentive to enter since the market is
allowing the firms to have profits higher than competitive
profits. The firms will entry, shifting the supply curve to
the right, lowering prices and increasing quantity supplied,
until the zero economic profit is reached.
Now, suppose that a firm decides to enter in a market in equilibrium.
The additional quantity being supplied shifts the supply curve
to the right, decreasing the price as a result of an increasing
in quantity. Then, the firms will exit the market until the
equilibrium is reached again.
Part Two – The Real World The industry I chose to apply the theory is the investment
banking particularly in Brazil. The product I will focus on
is the US-Dollar - Brazilian Real FRA (Forward rate agreement).
The customers are mainly multinational companies aiming at
protecting their revenues or capital against currency volatility.
If we consider the periods of relative stability in the Brazilian
currency markets, mainly prior 1999 devaluation, the market
is very close to the definition of competitive markets: 1. Banks were price-takers facing a horizontal demand curve,
being the spread charged only to cover basically credit risk
and operating costs.
2. The product was undifferentiated, or in other words, almost
every bank offered the same contract, and the differences
in terms of banks’ credit risk perceived by firms were
negligible.
3. Free-cost entry and exit, meaning that for banks were very
easy to create a Sales Desk to trade with the customers whenever
the profits justify doing so. Hence, in this scenario, that specific industry within investment
banking industry was very competitive and in the long run
seemed to be in equilibrium: 1. the banks were maximizing profit
2. all banks are earning zero economic profit in that particular
activity
3. The price of that product, as in any other financial market,
was implied by the demand and supply curves. But in the 1999 crisis, during the period comprising the
months just before and those right after the devaluation,
the picture was very different and the market did not behave
as a competitive one. Firstly, since the companies credit risk changed significantly,
the banks’ mark-up was much higher. In addition, companies,
fearing a default of small banks, were allowed by their headquarters
to trade only with a select group of banks. This discrimination
increased the spread banks charged them making their economic
profit much higher than zero. Since the market, as response
to the crisis, shrank as several banks were avoiding speculative
and proprietary positions, the banks willing to trade had
a considerable influence on the market. The product, viewed
now as a combination of the product itself plus the counterpart,
was no longer undifferentiated. Finally, the cost of entry
turned to be very high since it involved among other factors
credibility. In conclusion, this specific industry seems to validate the
theory in stable markets but not during financial crisis and
I expect this behaviour to be held in the future. During turmoil,
due to the reasons explained above, the market approximates
more to an oligopoly than to a competitive market.
|