Compare and contrast soft and hard determinism in respect to competing notion of negative and positive freedom
Are we free? Our general experiences would seem to suggest so. When faced with various options we have the perception that we are free to make decisions between them. Philosophically freedom is divided into two types: negative and positive.
Or put differently freedom from as opposed to freedom to. Negative freedom is characterised by the absence of an oppressive or limiting factor, such as a law restricting movement or activities, we are free from oppression. Positive freedom is our ability to do something, such as pick an apple. It is freedom whereby you are free to do something. Our common conception is that both of these types of freedom are possible.
Classical physics however depicts a world that is causal: that objects interact via definable rules and to given patterns as Laplace states.
If an ideal observer knew the positions of all the particles at a given instant and knew all the laws governing their movements, he could predict and retrospectively explain the entire history of the universe. The problem for the philosopher is thus: given what we know about the universe and that we are apart of it, and therefore subject to its laws how do we reconcile a causal universe with a concept of free will. If everything is determined how can we be free to choose our own actions?
The hard determinist argues that we are not free. The argument is simple: if something must occur it cannot be free, in a causal universe for every event there are a number of causes which ensure its occurrence, thus no action is free because it must occur. The hard determinist counters arguments that determinism is only true for the physical world and not for the realm of human experience by saying that human actions are caused by wants and those wants are in turn caused by the external causal rules of the universe. For the hard determinist we are never free from causes and therefore never free to do anything other than that which has be already determined.
Yet Human freedom if just a fact of experience. Demonstrated by the example that if you predict which way I will turn I can always falsify my action against you prediction. For the hard determinist this is simply a false perception perhaps an epiphenomenon of the causal relationships of the universe, we just think we acted freely. This does not mean to say this is true and the determinist remains open to some very strong counter arguments.
Soft determinism attempts to reconcile our experience of freedom with the concept of a causal universe and therefore is often called compatibalism. The soft determinist accepts that we are never free from causes that everything is determined. They disagree with the hard determinist that is something must occur argue with the statement that if something must occur it cannot be free. There argument is that we commonly use the word free to describe actions that are voluntary, and consequently an un-free action is one that is forced. The soft determinist argues that the hard determinist mistakes the word caused with the word forced.
Simply because an action is caused does not mean to say that it is un-free. Written in the reverse: why would you ever do something without any reason (cause) to do so. The example often sighted is that of a man be forced to open a safe at gun point the argument is that the man could equally voluntarily open a safe without being forced. The soft determinist is arguing that this exhibition of voluntary action is freedom. We are thus free to do things through voluntary action. The charge against the soft determinist is that this is simply word play. That it denies the substance of free will whilst maintaining its verbal shell.
Is this soft determinism more like somebody hypnotised to perform a certain action. When woken from the hypnotic trance they will perform the action and often give reasons for their behaviour yet we would not say that they acted freely in the common sense that to be free you must be free to control your own actions. For any genuine freedom it would seem we would also need to be free to chose a differently given the same situation and same conditions.
The soft determinist seems unable to allow us this given as it agrees with the hard determinist that everything is caused, given the safe conditions we would have the same causes and therefore the same reasons leading to the same action. It would seem that whilst the hard determinist denies us freedom from causes and freedom to do anything other than what is determined the soft determinist is willing to allow us freedom to do these actions voluntarily but we are still not free to do anything other than what is determined.
We can never be free from causes. Even if we refute entirely determinism within human action we are still left operating within a determined universe. Does this however impact on our other freedoms: our ability to make voluntary actions for example. If we equate caused with forced then it seems we are not free in any sense. That human existence is reduced to being a ball in an infinitely complex game of pool, or perhaps even just a fleck of chalk dust as the queue ball is struck. However if we equate cause with reason, why can we still not retain our freedom to do voluntary actions.
Even this soft determinist stance seems to deny us the freedom to do something other than a single caused action, there still seems no choice. Neither hard nor soft determinism seem compatible with our ordinary experience of freedom. Is our perception of freedom then real, or merely some epiphenomena of a complex causal system. As none independent observers we may never be able to know, or it may depend more eon what we mean by freedom than on actual reality. Even the seemingly simple determined world is not without its problems. If nothing happens unless it is caused, the essential route of determinism, what caused the first cause?
Bibliography
Brenda Almond, Exploring Philosophy, Blackwell: Oxford, 1995
John Cottingham (Ed), Western Philosophy An Anthology, Macmillan Publishing: London,2001
Thomas Mautner (Ed), The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, Penguin Books: London, 2000
D. Miller, The Blackwell Encyclopaedia Of Political Thought, Blackwell: Oxford, 1995
John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science, Penguin Books: London, 1989
Tags: determinism, freedom, oppression, philosophy
