Why did France lose the Franco-prussian war?
Within this essay I aim to attempt to identify some of the key elements within the Franco-Prussian war that led to the crushing French defeat. Some of the key issues to be considered will be the relative armies, strategy and tactics as well as the diplomacy conducted by both sides.
Politics.
During the period in the lead up to the war in the late 1860’s, the political situation was changing. The traditionally dominant France was in serious danger of being supplanted by the rising Prussia. Bismarck had looked, to say the least, astute in his international diplomacy in preventing the purchase of Luxembourg from the Dutch by the French. Napoleon III, on the other hand, was beset with internal rifts. Republicans were constantly calling for democratic reform and there were constant rumours of revolution. War with Prussia was becoming increasingly inevitable. Prussia was also beset with internal difficulties that led Bismarck to conclude that war was also inevitable.
Diplomacy.
Once war was declared, France sought allies in the form of Denmark, Austria, Bavaria and the southern German monarchies, all of whom had suffered recent defeats at the hands of the Prussians. Napoleon III failed, however, to secure any help from these states, all of whom were apparently unwilling to risk further defeats. France was also unsuccessful in securing other allies, Russia was still smarting over Franc’s involvement in the Crimean was and Italian nationalists were upset at France’s position protector of the Papal States. Bismarck was also busy diplomatically; he acted to isolate France by conducting mutual non-aggression pacts with the southern German monarchies which evolved into actual military aid for Prussia during the war. Bismarck was also successful in ensuring Britain did not join the impending war on the side of the French.
Opposing Armies.
The two opposing forces were very different in character and in this we can see the seeds of one of the reasons for the French defeat. The French army was large, comprising some 400,000 regular soldiers. Many of these were veterans of previous French campaigns and were thus not mere raw recruits. In terms of equipment, the individual French soldier was also superior to his Prussian counterpart; the French being equipped with the breech loading Chessepot rifle, one of the most up to date weapons available at the time. It was quick to loads and had an effective range of up to 1500m. The major French military disadvantage was in artillery, they used a muzzle loaded 4 pound gun. For the French, artillery technology had advanced little since Waterloo. The French were also equipped with a primitive version of a machine gun. The mitrailleuse was mounted on an artillery base and was organised into units along exactly the same lines as artillery batteries.
The Prussian army was rather different, consisting not of veteran regulars but of conscripts. Service in the Prussian army was compulsory for all men of military age thus the potential size of the army available to Bismarck and von Moltke was vast in comparison to the French. The combined armies of Prussia and her southern German allies could reach 1.2 million. The army was equipped with the so called “needle gun”, a relatively old rifle and not comparable to those use by the French, having an effective range of only around 600 m. Prussian deficiencies in infantry equipment ended with the rifle, their artillery was far superior, utilising the Krupp 6 pound breech loading cannon. The Prussian cannons fires an explosive shell which had an effective range of 4.5 km and a vastly superior rate of fire to the artillery pieces possessed by the French. These cannons gave the Prussians a decisive tactical advantage as we will see. The Prussian army was unique in Europe at the time for employing a system that is common in modern warfare; they employed a general staff who were responsible for organisational aspects of warfare, logistics, operational movements, communications and the development of strategy. The presence of a staff meant that many opinions were considered and evaluated, rather than simply the opinions of only one man dominating.
The French had the initial advantage in that they had a standing army any it would take time for the Prussians and their allies to mobilise their armies. In order to capitalise upon this advantage the French forces had to act quickly and decisively before superior Prussian numbers could be brought to bear.
The War.
On July 28th 1870, Napoleon III took command of the newly titled Army of the Rhine; a significant force of around 100,000 French troops. The French had a pre-war plan to take advantage of their standing army in comparison to the Prussian requirement to conscript its troops. The plan was simple, an offensive movement from Thionvile towards Trier and into the Prussian heartland. The plan, however, was foolishly discarded in favour of an essentially defensive strategy, an occupation of the border region with the idea of repelling any Prussian offensive, this strategy handed the tactical initiative straight to the Prussian forces. The Prussian forces mobilised quickly and by August 3rd an army totaling something like 320,000 troops opposed the much smaller French forces. By this time Napoleon III was under immense domestic pressure to act, so he ordered a limited offensive movement towards the town of Saarbrucken. The French offensive was successful, but despite being hailed by the French as the first step into the Rhineland, its logistical links were poor and the French found themselves surrounded by 3 Prussian armies.
The French forces quickly withdrew to their former position and battle quickly ensued. The French were in a strong position but were spread to thinly and fighting was indecisive. The following day the French were decisively defeated at Spicheren. They managed to hold the Prussians at bay but only long enough for a second Prussian army to advance and change the tide of the battle: French inferiority in numbers and Prussian superiority in artillery again playing a crucial role. The two armies clashed again the following day at Woerth but by this time they were heavily outnumbered. The Prussians had been reinforced and now totaled round 140,000 troops whereas the French had a mere 35,000. The superiority of the Prussian artillery was evident but both sides suffered heavy casualties; The French, fearing a massacre broke and retreated. These two battles represented two crushing defeats for the French and two of what was to become three decisive setbacks.
A key element in the overall French defeat can be seen on August 16th at Mars-le-Tour, 130,000 French soldiers were attacked by a mere 30,000 Prussians. The Prussians believed mistakenly that they were attacking the rear guard of the retreating forces whereas they were attaching the French main remaining strength. Despite being heavily outnumbered the Prussians attached repeatedly and the French forces were decimated and forced to retreat yet again. The Prussians again proving their motivation and belief in their ultimate victory, set against gross indecision and confusion on the part of the French.
Two days after Mars-le-Tour occurred the largest battle of the whole Franco-Prussian war, the battle of Gravelotte. The Prussian forces totaled around 180,000 men while the French mustered around 110,000. The French were dug in and awaiting the Prussian advance, when it finally occurred the French had the upper hand due to their superiority in rifles; however, the Prussian artillery was, as always, far superior and cut the French to shreds. Casualties on both sides were terrible; the Prussians loosing in excess of 20,000 men and the French almost 8,000, most of whom were killed by the Prussian Krupp Artillery pieces.
The French again suffered on September 1st at Sedan. Napoleon III had gathered together another army and marched towards the Belgian border with the intention of initially avoiding the Prussian forces and linking up with the surviving elements of the Gravelotte army. The maneuver had been widely recognised as an incompetent one and allowed the Prussians to capture the Prussians in a pincer like movement. This incompetence in the French high command is a common theme throughout the campaign and one of the chief reasons, coupled with exactly the opposite from the Prussians, why the French lost the war. The day after Sedan, Napoleon III surrendered to the Prussians, as did over 100,000 French soldiers.
The Germans hoped and believed that the war would be over at this point, the Prussian leadership asked for a list of seemingly reasonable demands that included some territorial acquisitions in the Alsace region, the French rejected these proposals and the war continued, despite most of the French army now being out of action. With the refusal, the Prussians began a siege of the heavily fortified and defended Paris but even this did not hold out long and with its fall came the end of the Franco-Prussian War.
Conclusion.
It would seem evident that there was not one single and simple factor that led to the French loss in the Franco-Prussian war but a whole series. At the outset of the war they possessed a standing professional army, largely veterans of many campaigns including Crimea and the war in Mexico; these were seasoned troops of a high quality. The Prussian army, by contrast, consisted of conscripts. This should have given the French a significant advantage but it was never utilised. The fact that the French had a standing army and the Prussians had to mobilise almost from scratch should also have been a significant advantage. If the French command had acted quickly and decisively to invade Prussian land instead of taking up a defensive posture, a different outcome could potentially have been achieved. This utter failure on the part of the French high command was a significant factor in their defeat. The French also possessed superiority in rifles but never managed to take advantage of this, the increased range of the French arms as against the Prussian should have been used more effectively, but was not. A major factor was the Prussian commanders realising their own deficiencies in this regard and using their artillery to its greatest effectiveness, in many of the battles this (along with superior numbers) was usually one of the most decisive factors. Throughout most of the war the Persian forces were simply more flexible and more mobile, the utilisation of a general staff principle to help deal with many of the day to day issues of logistics and troop movements without encumbering the overall commander with such considerations led the Prussians to be more flexible and prepared at key points. The French seem sluggish and only able to react to the Prussians offensives rather that force an issue themselves. Prussian self belief also grew quickly with each passing victory, as did, conversely, French pessimism among the army. Self belief has always been and will always remain a very powerful force. Finally a word should be said about the opposing commanders, Napoleon III proved less than competent compared to his Prussian counterpart, von Moltke and Bismarck.
Bibliography
J. F. C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World and their Influence upon History (London 1956)
M. Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France 1870-1971 (London 1962)
G. Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 (Cambridge 2003)
D. Wetzel, A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War (London 2001)
