How dangerous has the nuclear arms race in South Asia been between China, India and Pakistan?
The nuclear arms race in South Asia has largely avoided political discourse in the West. The protracted demise of the Soviet Union deflected attention away from geo political strategies taking place in South Asia towards the end of the twentieth century with the result that a very precarious position has since prevailed in the region whereby three powers each have the mutually assured power to destroy one another.
For just a single international power to have such destruction within their military capabilities is dangerous enough: for three rival powers to be equipped in such a manner is deeply concerning for the broader world order. However, as shall be shown, the issue of nuclear arms is impossible to divorce from the greater question relating to political models and military tradition. It is, for instance, an inherently different affair for democratic nations such as the USA, France and Britain to harbour nuclear capabilities than it is for an authoritarian regime, as Sunil Khilnani (2000:14 15) attests in relation to ongoing tensions in South Asia.
True, democracy is no guarantee against the use of a nuclear bomb: we must always remember that the first user of nuclear bombs was democratic America. But military regimes can offer even less of an assurance. Neglect of the difficult task of building long term friendship with Pakistan could cost [India] very dear, especially of the Indo Pakistan discourse stays under the thumb of diplomats and soldiers, serving or retired.
For the purposes of this essay a chronological and analytical approach will be taken to the nuclear arms race in South Asia to see how the region has evolved from third world status to access to a select league of predominantly western military powers. A conclusion will be sought after examining all of the available evidence which suggests that future developments pertaining to the status quo in South Asia will dominate world affairs and necessarily affect the nascent American policy of globalisation.
The first South Asian power to access nuclear power
The first South Asian power to access nuclear power was China, which conducted its first successful experiment in 1964 after vital instruction from the socialist ally of the former USSR. It has since conducted forty four similar nuclear tests. The impetus behind the desire to acquire nuclear capability was the need to create a sense of communist solidarity in the world, to ensure that socialism could unite against the capitalist powers of the West in the event of an escalation of the tensions between America and Russia. China’s initial flirtation with nuclear weaponry should therefore always be viewed within the unique context of the Cold War, an ideological element that remains a determining factor of the Chinese state in the twenty first century. Yet despite the longevity of China’s nuclear capability, Western interest in the topic is a relatively recent affair. As has been seen with regards to the Chinese incursion into space, the rate of military and technological progress achieved by Beijing has startled the rest of the world and inherently alarmed many world powers. As Twitchett and Fairbank (1990:871) testify, the political and military accession of China is quicker than nuclear analysts are currently able to cope with.
In the growing flood of publication on modern Chinese history, especially from the PRC, research aids and documentary materials seem to be increasing even faster than historical studies that make use of them.
With an undemocratic tradition as well as a long history of international isolationism, China has long been seen as a serious danger to Western hegemony for precisely this lack of insight. It is estimated that Chinese warheads currently number between two hundred and four hundred and fifty though the effectiveness of this arsenal is still shrouded in mystery. Certainly, the lack of a space based early warning system and the command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) makes China incapable of fighting a ‘limited’ nuclear war at present. As by far the strongest of the South Asian powers, this key fact should be borne in mind throughout. Neither India nor Pakistan ought to be seen in the same military context as Western arsenals.
China’s nuclear experience
China’s nuclear experience has in many respects been unique. China is alone in its ‘no first use’ policy and its call for a complete destruction and prohibition of nuclear weapons in international relations. However, as it has transpired (largely in relation to the military manoeuvres of Indian and Pakistan), China will only begin to scale back its nuclear arsenal only once the USA and Russia first reduce their capabilities by 50 per cent. Furthermore, as Hutchings (2000:323) suggests, the symbolic gesture of becoming a nuclear power has meant more to China than issues of morality, where there appears to be little in the way of domestic opposition. China is the only nuclear power without a tradition of nuclear dissent.
China is indeed a member of the 1991 Non proliferation Treaty but analysts have long supposed that this was in response to the global reportage of the Tiananmen Square Massacre two years earlier. Likewise, the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not been signed by China though that is a direct result of the tests conducted by first and India and then Pakistan during May 1998. As each nuclear test reveals countless intricacies into nuclear progression, China currently feels that instability in the region is reason enough for a continuation rather than a reduction of nuclear manufacturing and testing. Attention must now be turned to India and Pakistan, whose successful nuclear tests in the late 1990’s mirrored those of China thirty years previously with the same sentiment of horror shared by the western world as a result.
India claimed that China’s status as a nuclear power was its chief motivating factor behind its own tests of atomic bombs. Pakistan, in turn, has since claimed that New Delhi’s newly discovered nuclear role was likewise its specific inspiration to acquire the same technological means of mass destruction. The reasoning behind both is firmly located in the nature of the geo political struggle that has marked India’s relationship to Pakistan since the latter was given independence in 1947, characterised by three wars (1948, 1965 and 1971 respectively). India, like China, views the possession of nuclear weapons as the symbol of true political and strategic power. As Robertson (1989:276) explains, a nuclear arsenal is central to broader Indian Policy in South Asia.
Stated precisely, the primary objective of Indian policy in South Asia has been to extract, in some form or another, recognition of India’s hegemonic status in the region from both the major external powers and from its neighbours in the regions. Although there is a strong pacifist tradition in India that has vocalised itself against the government’s desire to accumulate nuclear weaponry, India is unlikely to change direction in terms of its current foreign policy. The sheer size of the country home of the first billion populace in world history has been seen as reason in itself for India to flex its military muscle in the region though the Pakistan Question is at the epicentre of the issue for both of these South Asian nations. The prevailing antagonism over Kashmir continues to cast a shadow over international relations in the region and the infancy of nationalism in both countries compared to the two thousand year civilisation of China is deeply worrying for international analysts. However, Indian aid in the face of the recent earthquake in Pakistan highlights a less dangerous future in the area; as ever, compassion in the face of adversity brings nations back from the brink of conflict.
Conclusion
To state that the South Asian situation pertaining to nuclear arms is dangerous is to state a political fact. The danger, at present, is located firmly within that geo political region with none of the three major protagonists in possession of sufficient warheads to pose a serious military threat to the West at this stage. However, for as long as the three countries continue to research, develop and even test new types of atomic bombs, then the future will look increasingly bleak. China in particular is a grave threat to the global dominance of the United States as the economic and industrial output of the nation is currently outstripping the only remaining international superpower. Coupled with the world’s largest land army, China will, without doubt, become the nexus of global agreement and discord throughout the remainder of the century.
However, to believe that the democracy of India somehow acts as a balance in between the other two authoritarian nuclear powers in South Asia is incorrect. Democracy as it is understood in the West is lacking in India, whose geography alone makes comparisons with the West obsolete, as McLane (1970:161) underlines. Regionalism, like communalism hampered nationalist attempts to build a unified India.
India, like Pakistan and China, is controlled largely by local economic and political concerns with a central government that has little remit throughout the sub continent. Ultimately, in a world that has hitherto been dominated by European and American issues, the concern over South Asia is one of comprehension as much as intra state rivalry.
Bibliography
S. Ganguly, Conflict Unending: Indo Pakistani Tensions since 1947 (Columbia University Press; New York, 2002)
P. Gupte, India: the Challenge of Change (Methuen; London, 1990)
R.L. Hardgrave Jr. & S.A. Kochanek, India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation: Fifth Edition (Ted Buchholz; Orlando, 1993)
G. Hutchings, Modern China: a Companion to a Rising Power (Penguin; London, 2000)
J. Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism (Fontana; London, 1994)
A. Kapur, Regional Security Structures in Asia (Routledge; London & New York, 2002)
J.R. McLane, The Political Awakening in India (Prentice Hall; Englewood Cliffs, 1970)
F. Robinson (Edtd.), The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 1989)
R. Thapar (Edtd.), India: Another Millennium? (Penguin; London, 2000)
D. Twitchett & J.K. Fairbank (Edtd.), The Cambridge History of China, Volume 13 Republican China, 1912 1949: Part Two (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 1990)
Selected Articles
S. Khilnani, The Balance of Democracy, quoted in, R. Thapar (Edtd.), India: Another Millennium? (Penguin; London, 2000)
Tags: China, destruction, former USSR, History Essays, India, nuclear arms, nuclear power, nuclear race, Pakistan
