‘Consensus is a mirage, an illusion which rapidly fades the closer one gets to it’ (Ben Pimlott). To what extent do you think that Pimlott’s assessment can be applied to the political consensus which emerged in Britain during the war and culminated in Labour’s victory in 1945?
Consensus is the general agreement between individuals and groups, usually taken to mean a meeting of interests between the majority of interested people (Hawkins 1988, p. 101).
In political terms the Second World War is argued to have produced a consensus between the political parties that ultimately saw the emergence of a Welfare State as part of a growing acceptance of the role of the ordinary citizen in what was essentially a ‘people’s war’. However, Professor Pimlott’s quote raises the question as to what extent one should apply the term consensus to the political landscape during the conflict. Despite an apparent consensus between the political parties and individual politicians, brought together by the extenuating circumstances of world conflict, it can be argued that considerable divergences existed. However, this essay will argue, as Paul Addison does, that the Second World War brought about a new political consensus (Addison 1994, p.13). The war saw the shift of political consensus and public opinion from conservative values to those encapsulated by the Labour Party and the political Left, which recognised the need for a better society after the conflict. Far from fading under scrutiny the consensus generated during the war, crystallised in the 1945 Labour landslide, continued beyond the end of the conflict.
The shift to a political consensus in the Second World War by a range of politicians, favouring the views of the Left, can be attributed to a number of factors. The 1942 Beveridge Report is often cited as the major turning point in the Second World War in terms of a political shift to the Left. However, Paul Addison takes a wider view and argues that one should look at 1940 as the key component in the formation of a new left-leaning political consensus that took concrete form in the election of 1945 (Addison 1994, p. 17). Since the publication of Addison’s text the widely perceived understanding of the rise of the Labour Party, Stephen Brooke suggests:
[H]as been dominated by the notion of a political consensus forged during the Churchill coalition and left as a legacy to the Attlee government. According to Addison, it was the consensus of Keynes and Beveridge that shaped post-war politics rather than any distinctive contribution from Labour (Brooke 1989, p. 157).
Thus, Brookes draws out a distinction between the development of a Left-leaning consensus and the actual influence of the Labour Party. This in itself is a telling reflection of the cross-party political consensus that superseded traditional party doctrine and loyalties. The wartime coalition cobbled together a range of political backgrounds that transcended party boundaries; in essence it formed a political consensus. This consensus ultimately adopted Left-leaning characteristics that culminated in the 1945 Labour election victory. However, the victory was not solely for the Labour Party but for the new consensus.
The reason this was possible is rooted in the initial phases of the conflict and the extenuating circumstances of a total war. It was during the early, crucial, period that the Right required the aid of the Left and recruited them into the government. The priority became the sustaining of the public morale during the ‘people’s war’ and this shift in emphasis is the reason for the proceeding dominance of a Leftward consensus in British politics. The Second World War provided the ideal environment for a new Leftward political consensus to form as the State was forced to involve itself increasingly in the everyday affairs of its citizens, from the economy to employment to housing.
The environment conducive to foster Left-leaning political values can also be pre-dated to earlier periods. The precedent of the experiences of the First World War meant that mobilising the State was easier to achieve and the expansion of the government into the lives of the British people went hand-in-hand with the politics of the Left. The shadow of the Great War also ensured that the public were less willing to cooperate in a total war without the guarantees of social development in peacetime. During the inter-war period, as Stephen Brookes notes, the depression and then the Second World War, had demonstrated that the ‘anarchy of free-market capitalism’ needed to give way to a more ordered economy (Brookes 1991, p. 687). Thus, just as Labour politicians’ credibility to govern was boosted by the inclusion in government, so too had experiences necessitated economic policies on a socialist scale.
The attraction of traditionally Labour policies across the political spectrum mirrored a shift in the public’s demands and expectations for the post-war British society. The expectations transcended class and political boundaries and as such did not solely represent an emboldening of the working class due to the exceptional circumstances of the war. A report by the Home Intelligence Division recorded that:
‘During the early part of the war, socialism developed among people who, thrown out of their normal circumstances, were more in contact with the poorer classes’. But more recently it appears to have increased considerably ‘among black-coated workers who are said to be reading and discussing a great deal’. The ‘employer class’, as well as those who formerly always voted conservative, are also ‘turning to this idea’. Many of them appear to feel that socialism is inevitable, and are resigned to the prospect (Jefferys 1994, p.123).
In this respect the political consensus and the popular consensus both demonstrated the move towards socialist principles. This movement demonstrates the strength of the new consensus that withstands close scrutiny, unlike Pimlott’s assertion. The strength of feeling is further emphasised by the success of independent candidates in by-elections, the most prominent of which came in West Derbyshire in February 1944. The shift also saw the emergence of the Common Wealth Party as an alternative to the Conservatives and Labour, consisting of middle-class, left-wing idealists, pledged to the implementation of the Beveridge Report. With the Conservative and Labour Parties calling a by-election truce the interest in independent or Left-leaning candidates, demonstrates some evidence of a public shift away from conservative values.
Despite the evidence presented above such argument should not exclude evidence that ran contrary to the concept of a new political consensus during the Second World War. The short and long-term aims of the war meant that Winston Churchill attempted to ensure the focus of the public remained fixed on winning the conflict rather than debating the social construct of a post-war society. In this respect Churchill was distancing himself and the Conservative Party from public demands for a fairer post-war society. This detachment was compounded by the positive association of Labour ministers with the policies of the new consensus. In addition to sharing power with the Conservatives, Clive Ponting observes, Labour ministers were given considerable free-reign to implement some of their ideas on the home front:
This freedom, combined with the unprecedented levels of government intervention in the economic and social fields required by the war effort and the need to build a consensus within society about the positive results that would come in peace as a result of the wartime sacrifices, produced policies radically different from those of the pre-war Conservative government (Ponting 1990, p. 76).
This distinction between the political parties is essential for explaining how the political consensus of the Second World War culminated in the 1945 general election landslide by the Labour Party and the rejection of wartime leader Churchill. Labour was seen as the party to implement the Left-leaning consensus fostered during the war. Churchill’s efforts the target the aim of the British people on winning the war had seemingly meant he was cool at best to implementing social change post-war. His determination to complete the job in hand and his ultimate victory in achieving this hampered his post-war chances of success.
The clearest example of Churchill’s apparent disassociation with the new consensus came in his reaction to the Beveridge Report that, in contrast to Churchill’s attitude, was enthusiastically absorbed by the public. Furthermore, Labour was associated with free milk for mothers and free school meals, practical evidence of their moves towards a fairer society. Pimlott’s quote may appear to hold some credence here as close scrutiny appears to show division between the Conservatives and Labour. However, this ignores the fact that the political consensus extended beyond the party hierarchies and beyond the politicians. The consensus encapsulated public opinion, as Labour was deemed to share these values the consensus resulted in a resounding victory for them.
The Labour victory of 1945 was by no means a certainty for political observers of the time and there were confusing signals. Steven Fielding has noted that even as late as March 1945 forty-three percent of people polled favoured the continuation of a political coalition between Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberals (Fielding 1992, p. 629). However, at the 1945 Labour conference the party voted against bi-partisanship and elected to stand up for its socialist agenda. Fielding goes on to suggest that rather than an overwhelming swing from the Conservatives to Labour for the reasons outlined above, it was the disbelief that the Liberals could win that saw the anti-Conservative vote fall to Labour (Fielding 1992, p. 630). However, as already discussed, the political consensus transcended specific party boundaries and incorporated popular opinion. The overwhelming consensus was that extensive reform was necessary in the post-war period and it was this consensus that swept the party most likely to reform, and untainted by pre-war failures, to power.
Tory reformers had also moved to acceptance of the changing social circumstances brought about by conflict. Calder has noted how the emphasis placed on such post-war reconstruction differed because of the different support bases of the Conservatives and Labour (Calder 2000, p. 532). The Labour Party with its working-class support stressed the importance of nationalisation while the Tories emphasised rationalisation. But, as Calder notes, ‘in practice the two would be little different’ (Calder 2000, p.532). In essence politicians across the spectrum had moved to a consensus on the nature of the post-war world that agreed that capitalism would stay ‘but the state would take a positive role in promoting its efficiency, which would include measures of nationalisation’ (Calder 2000, p.532). It is this consensus that shaped the 1945 election and endured past the conflict and well into the post-war reconstruction. As Arthur Marwick has noted, many of the conditions of war prevailed until early 1950 (Marwick 1990, p. 18). This is true of the legacy of political consensus. Borne out of the Second World War environment the continuation of the conditions mirrors the continued adherence to the political consensus. The creation and survival of this consensus demonstrates its practical strength rather than its illusionary, unrealistic vapidity.
The existence of a political consensus during the Second World War has often been justified by a number of key issues. The Labour general election victory of 1945 seemingly stands as incontrovertible proof of a Left-ward shift in the popular and political attitude of the British people. Allied with Churchill’s supposed tepid reaction to discussions on post-war reforms, notably the Beveridge Report, the rejection of the wartime leader provides further proof. However, this analysis could also lend credence to the argument that the consensus was not strong and was indeed illusionary. By highlighting the differences between the political parties, resulting in the rejection of one and the embracing of the other, one is actually demonstrating political division. Thus, one needs to look beyond traditional political alliances to find the true consensus. The agreement between political ideologies is found in an appreciation of the need for social reorganisation across the political spectrum. Conservatives, Liberals and Labour alike saw the need to reward the foot soldiers of the ‘people’s war’. The majority of interested parties, the true meaning of consensus, demanded social changes. The ease with which these changes could be introduced came as a result of the necessity for state intervention to win a war of such magnitude. The necessity made the transition far easier for politicians of the political Right to stomach. As Addison notes succinctly:
The 1940s were the decade when the Conservatives were obliged to integrate some of Labour’s most important demands into their own philosophy. They were able to do so without too much pain because Labour’s demands had largely been cast in a mould of thought provided by the non-socialist intelligentsia between the wars and during World War II (Addison 1994, p.278)
It is with this argument that the above essay agrees. It would be relatively simple to highlight divergences between political leaders to demonstrate the lack of an overwhelming political consensus. However, consensus existed in the public and political arenas, it foundations were laid by the Conservative ‘Guilty Men’ and lasted past the actual conflict but still within many of the restrictions of post-war reconstruction. The legacy of this consensus remains today in Britain, albeit fragmented, and continues to dominate political and public discussion over the National Health Service and other electoral issues. Such longevity proves that the political consensus of the Second World War was certainly not a faint illusion.
Bibliography
Books
Addison, Paul, The Road to 1945. British Politics and the Second World War, London: Pimlico, 1994.
Barnett, Correlli, The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a
Great Nation, London: Papermac, 1987.
Brivati, Brian and Jones, Harriet (eds.), What Difference did the War Make?, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993.
Evans, Mary and Morgan, David, The Battle for Britain. Citizenship and Ideology in
the Second World War, London: Routledge, 1993.
Brooke, Stephen, Labour’s War: The Labour Party during the Second World War, Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.
Calder, Angus, The People’s War. Britain 1939-1945, London: Pimlico, 2000.
Hawkins, Joyce (ed.), The Oxford Minidictionary, Oxford: Calrendon Press, 1988.
Jefferys, Kevin (ed.), War and Reform. British Politics during the Second World War, Machester: Manchester University Press, 1994.
Marwick, Arthur, British Society since 1945, London: Penguin Books, 1990.
Ponting, Clive, 1940: Myth and Reality, London: Cardinal, 1990.
Articles
Brooke, Stephen 1991, ‘Problems of Socialist Planning’: Evan Durbin and the Labour Government of 1945’, The Historical Journal, vol.34, no. 3, pp. 687-702.
Brooke, Stephen 1989, ‘Revisionists and Fundamentalists: The Labour Party and Economic Policy during the Second World War’, The Historical Journal, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 157-175.
Fielding, Steven 1992, ‘What did ‘The People’ Want? The Meaning of the 1945 General Election’, The Historical Journal, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 623-639.
