Coursework

The potential for success in congestion charging in Glasgow

Forster (2005) looks at some of the reasons behind the eventual defeat of Edinburgh’s congestion charging plans in a public referendum, outlines how the proposed scheme would have worked and considers whether a referendum was necessary.

Forster (2005) also notes that Fife, West Lothian and Midlothian councils were all opposed to the scheme and also highlights the criticisms by environmental groups that the media was irresponsible and unbalanced in its reporting on the proposed congestion charging scheme. Wolmar (2005) considers why, when there is little doubt that congestion-charging schemes make financial and environmental sense, the rest of Britain is slow to follow London’s example. Again, Wolmar highlights the need to win over public opinion and to overcome technical difficulties. Wolmar concludes that the first big test of the feasibility of widespread road charging will be the scheme for lorry road user charging due for implementation across the UK in 2007/08. Interestingly, Emmerson (2005) considers how to win public support for congestion charging. Amongst the lessons to be learnt from the contrasting situations of Edinburgh and London, Emmerson identifies the need to convince people of the need for charging and suggests that tackling congestion is not seen as a priority by most members of the public. The idea of introducing congestion charging as part of a fiscally neutral approach involving reductions in motoring or other taxation is recommended.

The main findings in the Second Annual Report, published by Transport for London in April 2004, suggests that congestion within the zone has reduced by 30%, and the volume of traffic within the zone has reduced by 15%. These figures represent upper ranges of Transport for London’s prior predictions concerning the impact of the charges on levels of congestion. There have been significant improvements to bus services in the zone and more widely throughout London. There has been an estimated 38 percent increase in patronage and a 23 percent increase in service provision compared with 2002. Approximately 19% of the increased patronage is attributable to the congestion charging. The fact that travel to central London by underground during 2003 declined failed to impact upon the overall improvement of public transport in successfully accommodating displaced car users. There was a decline of some 8% in the numbers of people using the underground but this was attributed to the fact that fewer people were visiting central London, probably for reasons unconnected with congestion charges. The Transport for London report also found no significant changes in the number of passengers using the National Rail network to enter central London between 2002 and 2003. The report also found no evidence to suggest that there were any increases in the number of people parking at railways stations in inner and outer London as a result of congestion charging.
Approximately half of the 70, 000 car journeys which are no longer made to central London during congestion charging periods are now made via various forms of public transport. The report also estimates that approximately 20-10% of journeys made, with origin and destination outside the congestion charging zone, now circumnavigate the charge zone. Some 15 – 25% of journeys have also been affected, with adaptations made to their timing. Comparative analyses of the many influences on the central London economy throughout 2003 suggest that the direct impact of congestion charging on business activity was limited However, the difficulties posed to London’s economy during 2003 also made it harder to identify direct impacts arising from the onset of congestion charges. The majority of businesses located within the charge zone, or on the boundary were/are generally supportive. There is, however, a difference of perspective between different sectors, particularly the retail sector. Reduced numbers of travellers to central London does not equate with the scale of effects identified by some retailers, the scale of which points towards broader economic and political factors that have accounted for the performance of the retail sector within the charging zone during 2003. However, the upsurge in the retail sector at the end of 2003/early 2004 suggests that congestion charging has not had a major long-term impact since consumer activity was higher in the “zone” compared with the UK average.

Essentially, the London congestion charging scheme (CCS) was successfully implemented in February 2003 and has measurably reduced traffic flows in central London. The air pollution impact of the scheme has been difficult to assess, using ambient measurements alone as the air pollution concentrations in 2003 were higher than in 2002 because of unusual meteorological conditions. However, a comprehensive analysis of the impact using detailed traffic data combined with a traffic emissions model has identified a number of important results. Firstly, between 2002 and 2003, total NOX emissions in the charging zone have reduced by -12.0% +/- 12% (2sigma) and have increased on the inner ring road (IRR) by + 1.5%. PM10 emissions have reduced by -11.9% in the charging zone and by -1.4% on the IRR (Beevers and Carslaw, 2005) There is a significant reduction in the emissions of NOX and PM10 associated with increases in vehicle speed and that this is as important in reducing emissions as changes in vehicle numbers. There is also evidence that the speed changes in km h(-1) are uniform across the whole range of average speed and therefore change, at the slower speeds have a disproportionate effect on vehicle emissions. Secondly, that changes in vehicle km as a result of the scheme are large (-15% +/- 4% (2sigma)) particularly in the charging zone itself. To meet the demand to travel into central London there has been increased bus use. However, the expected increase in emissions from buses have been mostly offset by the widespread introduction of particle traps to the new and existing bus fleet as well as the introduction of newer technology bus engines. Finally, there has been a reduction in emissions of CO (-19.5%) but that unlike NOX and PM10 little additional benefit is apparent through new vehicle technology. This evidence presented by Beevers and Carslaw, (2005) shows that the congestion charging schemes could assist in attaining both the UK government’s targets on air pollution as well as those relating to climate change and other international obligations.